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Analytic procedures allow auditors (or forensic accountants) to identify the presence of
unexpected relationships among financial data, including unusual transactions or events, and to
develop the scope of audit planning or investigation (Corbett and Clayton 2006, Bhattacharjee and
Machuga 2004, Asare and Wright 2001).The effectiveness of analytic techniques e.g., trend analysis,
ratio analysis, or a regression analysis depends on the precision of expectations developed (Kenyon
and Tilton 2006).However, there is a caveat associated with these expectations. Specifically, Hitzig
(2004) notes that “…because the expectation is specified by the auditor, and because the expectation’s
parameters are estimated from data that may be misstated [or contain fraudulent transactions], there is
a risk that reasonable expectations are incorrect…” (p. 34). As such, the risk of failing to detect the
presence of suspicious trends, patterns, or anomalies within the financial data likely exists. This
problem is referred to herein as the risk of Type II error.
On the other hand, analytic procedures infer propriety of individual transactions based on the
reasonableness of aggregated account balances or classes of transactions (Stringer and Stewart 1986, p.
16). The percentage of misdiagnosis associated with these procedures ranges from 15% to 50% (Kogan
et al. 2010) and research indicates that the use of daily or monthly disaggregated data improves the
effectiveness of analytic techniques (Kogan et al. 2010, Hoitash et al. 2006, Leitch and Chen 2003,
Chen and Leitch 1998, 1999, Dzeng 1994). Nonetheless, assessing for the presence of unusual
transactions may be difficult or costly when the volume of disaggregated data becomes considerably
large such as tens or hundreds of thousands (or even millions) of observations. In this case, analytic
procedures may be used to focus the audit planning or investigation on certain areas of concern
(Corbett and Clayton 2006). The effectiveness of this approach also depends on the precision of the
initial suspicion. In addition, the results of traditional statistical analytic techniques such as a
*
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regression or time series analysis associated with disaggregated data may be problematic when the
amount of data to examine increases or when several analytic procedures are used. These problems are
referred to herein as excessive power (Nigrini 2000, p. 75) and the risk of Type I error, respectively.
To address the issues described above, this study introduces a new bootstrap regression
(BREG) procedure in the context of Benford’s Law to identify unusual patterns of data using the first
two digits of financial data. The BREG procedure is based on simple regression analysis, which is a
commonly used technique by practitioners (Kogan et al. 2010, Corbett and Clayton 2006, Hoitash et
al. 2006, Leitch and Chen 2003, Chen and Leitch 1998, 1999, Dzeng 1994, Stringer 1986, Kinney and
Salamon 1982).Further, the BREG procedure is related to the technique introduced by Suh and
Headrick (2010) insofar as it is an overall analysis (rather than a digit-by-digit analysis), which
addresses the concern for Type I error (Cleary and Thibodeau 2005), and it is based on bootstrapping
conventional statistics such as a mean or variance.
Furthermore, the Benford parameters associated with these statistics are independently derived
of any implicit or explicit financial data subject to audit and the use of these parameters addresses the
concern for Type II error. Moreover, the BREG procedure, unlike other conventional statistical
procedures (e.g., chi-square goodness of fit test or the Nigrini distortion factor index 1996), can be
inexpensively applied to large disaggregated financial data sets without requiring any initial suspicions
about potential misstatements or fraud in specific account balances or classes of transactions. It also
mitigates the excessive power problem by making use of exact (Benford) bootstrap confidence
intervals that are based on the specific sample size of any given financial data set subject to audit.
To demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of the BREG procedure, we examined four
different types of data sets: (a) customer purchasing and credit card debt transactions referred to as
non-fraudulent data, (b) fabricated data referred to as non-Benford-like data, (c) Federal Election
Commission (FEC) in-kind contributions referred to as allegedly fraudulent data, and (d)
inventory/purchasing and revenue/cash receipt transactions from a Mexican retail company located in
Mexico City. A priori, we were aware of the nature of each data set except for the Mexican retail
company’s data. The results associated with the first three data sets were consistent with our prior
knowledge and demonstrate that the proposed BREG procedure provides accurate diagnoses.
Applications of the BREG procedure to the Mexican retail company data revealed unusual
transactions in specific accounts such as cash sales and inventory. Based on the diagnostic reports, the
Mexican retail company initiated further investigations and confirmed the presence of unusual
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activities across its divisions. For example, the retail company commented that “the results of the study
[diagnostic reports from the BREG procedure] corresponding to Division 3 reflect the reality. That is,
we were able to determine the existence of unusual transactions in inventory and cash sales. Additional
investigations confirm that these transactions were fraudulent. Currently, we are acting on this critical
situation.”
In the next section, the methodology for the proposed BREG procedure is developed and
explained in terms of how bootstrapping techniques are used in conjunction with regression analysis to
assess whether financial data likely contain unusual transactions or events. In the subsequent section
we present applications of the BREG procedure to non-fraudulent, fabricated non-Benford-like,
allegedly fraudulent, and the Mexican retail company data sets. In the last section, we discuss
applications of the BREG procedure in the context of Benford’s Law and make suggestions for further
research. We also discuss other statistical analytic techniques and the problems associated with these
techniques in the context of the Mexican retail company data.
METHODOLOGY
The Bootstrap and Regression (BREG)
The proposed bootstrap regression (BREG) procedure can be described by first generally
expressing a linear population regression model in terms of its parameters as

Yi  0  1 X i   i

(1)

where Yi is the dependent variable, X i is the independent variable,  i is the error term, and where

i  1,..., N . The estimates ( ˆ0 and ˆ1 ) associated with the parameters  0 and 1 are obtained based on
the method of ordinary least squares. In the context of hypothesis testing, one of the assumptions is
that the error term in (1) is normally distributed. However, a common problem is that real-world data
often fail to meet the normality assumption such as the case with discrete Benford-like data. In such
situations, nonparametric tests have demonstrated to be appropriate in terms of controlling Type I error
and power (e.g., Mooney and Duval 1993). For example, the bootstrap can be used to make
appropriate inferences associated with the population parameters (  0 and 1 ) without having to make
distributional assumptions regarding the error term  i in (1) (Efron and Tibshirani, 1998).
A fundamental description of the bootstrap in the context of the regression model in (1) begins
with randomly generating T bootstrap samples from the initial data set as
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 X iT , YiT 

for i  1,..., N . Each of the T samples contains the same number of N cases which are drawn

with equal probability and with replacement from the initial data set. The estimates of ˆ0 and ˆ1 are
computed for each of the T samples and subsequently ordered from minimum to maximum as

 

 

 

 

min ˆ0  ˆ01 ,..., max ˆ0  ˆ0T  and min ˆ1  ˆ11 ,..., max ˆ1  ˆ1T  to construct the bootstrap

confidence intervals (CIs). For example, if the specified Type I error rate was 0.05 and T  25,000
then the 95% CIs would appear generally as

 ˆ 
0

625

 



 0  ˆ0 24,375 and ˆ1 625  1  ˆ1 24,375 . For

further details on the theory and practice of the bootstrap in the context of regression analysis see
Efron and Tibshirani (1998) and Mooney and Duval (1993).
Benford’s Law and the BREG procedure
Benford (1938) proposed formulae to determine the exact probabilities for the first digits ( d1 )
and the second digits ( d 2 ) for certain kinds of data. Using a variety of large data sets, Benford (1938)
empirically demonstrated that the leading first digits closely follow their associated exact probabilities.
See Appendix A and Appendix B for tabled values of Benford probabilities and for formulae to
compute exact Benford probabilities, respectively.
The specific forms of the population regression models for the proposed BREG procedure
based on (1) and Benford’s Law are expressed in terms of the first digits d1 and the second digits d 2
as

d1i  0  1d2i  1i

(2)

d2i  0  1d1i   2i .

(3)

Using the regression models in (2) and (3), the following two sets of null hypotheses can be
formulated to test whether financial data follow Benford’s Law as

H 0,d1 : 0  3.239170 and 1  0.048018

(4)

H 0,d2 : 0  3.962264 and 1  0.065439 .

(5)

These two sets of parameters in (4) and (5) are referred to as “Benford parameters” because they were
derived under the assumption that the probability distributions associated with the first digits and the
second digits of a data set follow their exact Benford probabilities. See Appendix B for the derivations
of the Benford parameters in (4) and (5). Failing to reject the null hypotheses in (4) and (5) suggests
that financial data are unlikely to contain suspicious trends, patterns, or anomalies.
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The hypotheses in (4) and (5) are stated for both regression models in (2) and (3) because both

d1 and d 2 are considered to be random variables (Pedhazur, 1997; p. 38). Further, the bootstrapping
sampling procedure considers the two sets of hypotheses in (4) and (5) as independent of each other.1
However, within each regression model, there is a strong negative correlation between the estimates of
the intercept term and the slope coefficient i.e., 0 ,1  0 ,1  0.82 . As a result, a Bonferroni
adjustment to the conventional Type I error rate of 0.05 (i.e., 0.05 2  0.025 ) is used with
acorresponding 97.5% CIs for each parameter. This approach mitigates auditors from concluding
evidence of unusual transactions when there is none.
Given the specified Benford parameters in (4) and (5), the steps taken to evaluate for potential
variations in plausible relationships among financial data are: (a) obtain the leading first two digits
from the actual data under investigation and the exact first and second digits associated with Benfordlike (or fraud-free) data, (b) run the BREG procedure for the actual data digits and the exact (Benfordlike) data digits and obtain the 97.5% bootstrap CIs for the parameters in (2) and (3), and (c) evaluate
for the potential existence of unusual patterns of transactions by assessing financial data conformity to
Benford’s Law.
The decision criteria for part (c) are as follows: If all four bootstrap CIs associated with (4) and
(5) contain their respective Benford parameters or overlap with their corresponding exact (or Benford)
CIs then conclude that the digit patterns of the actual financial data follow Benford’s Law and that the
financial data unlikely contain unusual fluctuations that may signal potential misstatements or fraud.
Otherwise, if any one (or more) of the four CIs does not contain their respective Benford parameters or
does not overlap with their corresponding exact CIs, then infer that the financial data are suspicious
enough to initiate further detailed test of transactions (or investigation).We note that the use of CIs as
the decision criteria to infer the propriety of accounts balances or classes of transactions is consistent
with prior analytic procedure studies (e.g., Kogan 2010, Kinney 1979). For example, the presence of
potential anomalies is inferred if the predictive variable associated with the data exceeds either the
upper or lower limits of the prediction interval (Kogan, 2010,p. 27).
We would also note that the bootstrap CIs for the Benford parameters in(4) and (5) can be
obtained using TIBCO SpotfireS+ (Version 8.1, 2008). See Figure 1 for the S+ notations and an
illustration of the BREG procedure and the decision criteria. Note also that the bootstrap CIs can be
1

The independent relationship between the two sets of hypotheses in (4) and (5) is based on the fact that the initial random
seed numbers used to conduct the two bootstrap regression analyses are different.
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obtained using SPSS (PASW) statistics (Version 18.0, 2009) with the bootstrap add-on package. In
addition, the exact first and second digits are generated based on the specific N size of the actual data
and the exact probabilities for the first two digits are given in Suh and Headrick (2010)Table A.3. The
algorithms and instructions for generating exact digits are available at the following website:
http://www.siuc.edu/~epse1/headrick/Benford/ExactDigits.doc. The executable file to compute the first
two

digits

can

be

downloaded

by

using

the

following

link:

http://www.siuc.edu/~epse1/headrick/Benford/D1D2.exe (Suh and Headrick 2010, p. 149).
To demonstrate the decision criteria in Figure 1, consider a hypothetical checking account with
the 97.5% bootstrap CIs of  2.778  0  3.519 **,  0.034  1  0.0461 *,  2.965  0  3.561 *,
and  0.110  1  0.057  *.One asterisk (*) indicates that the CI overlaps with the Benford CI but
does not contain the parameter and two asterisks (**) denote that the CI contains the Benford
parameter. Inspection of these CIs indicates that the checking account transactions unlikely contain
suspicious patterns of data because one CI contains its respective Benford parameter and the remaining
CIs overlap with the following exact (or Benford) CIs for each parameter:

 2.578  0  3.309 ,

 0.017  1  0.061 , 3.128  0  3.995 , and  0.021  1  0.087  . Alternatively, given the same
exact CIs, if the 97.5% CIs associated with the checking account were (3.364   0  3.586),

 0.064  1  0.035 *,  2.965  0  3.561 *, and  0.110  1  0.054 *, then these results suggest
data are suspicious because one CI neither contains its Benford parameter nor overlaps with exact CI.
We would also note that bold numbers indicate that the CIs neither contain the Benford parameters nor
overlap with Benford CIs.
APPLICATIONS
Data
Four different kinds of data sets were used in this study. The first data set consisted of two
samples of individuals’(non-fraudulent) purchasing transactions targeted by a marketing campaign and
credit card debt transactions (SPSS, 2008). The second data set is fabricated non-Benford-like data
(Hill, 1988). We replicated the first digits and the second digits of the non-Benford-like data based on
the digit probabilities provided by Hill (1988, p. 969) who instructed his 742 undergraduate students to
write a six-digit number “out of their heads” (See Tables A.1 and A.2 in Appendix A). The third data
set consists of the 1994, 1996, and 2004 Federal Election Commission (FEC) committee-to-committee
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in-kind contributions and allegedly contains fraudulent transactions (Cho and Gaines, 2007). The FEC
in-kind contributions are cash, donated services, or bills paid by a third party on behalf of a campaign
committee. These contributions are not subject to a maximum threshold of donations mandated by the
government. The last data set includes inventory/purchasing and revenue/cash receipt transactions of a
retail company located in Mexico City. The Mexican retail company’s records were examined on a
daily basis and for each of three divisions during 2007-2009. The specific records are credit/cash sales,
cash collection, check/cash deposits, inventory, purchases, and purchase returns. We would note that
the exact (Benford) CIs associated with each of the four data sets are not tabulated in the following
section, but are available from the first author.
Results
Table A.1 and Table A.2 in Appendix A give the empirical probabilities associated with the
first digits and the second digits of the non-fraudulent Amount data (SPSS, 2008). These data represent
purchasing transactions of N  24,067 individuals targeted by a marketing campaign. The empirical
probabilities of the Amount data are juxtaposed with the exact Benford probabilities in Figure 2 and
Figure 3. Inspection of Tables A.1 and A.2 and Figures 2 and 3 suggests that the leading first digits and
second digits for the purchasing transaction data closely approximate Benford’s Law.
To validate our observations, the BREG procedure was conducted on the Amount data. The
results in Table 1 indicate that the Amount data conform to Benford’s Law. That is, all four bootstrap
CIs contain their respective Benford parameters in (3) and (4) or overlap with exact (or Benford) CIs.
In contradistinction, the results of the traditional statistical procedures on the first digits suggest that
the Amount data likely contain significant fluctuations that signal misstatements. Specifically, both the
chi-square test (  2  16.073, p  0.041) and the Nigrini (1996) distortion factor index (

Z  2.295, p  0.022 ) are statistically significant using a Type I error rate of 0.05 . The primary
reason for this discrepancy is the excessive power problem associated with these statistical tests as the
number of purchasing transactions becomes large ( N  24,067 ). This excessive power problem was
confirmed by a Monte Carlo simulation where we used the probabilities associated with the Amount
data in Table A.1 as a basis to generate observed frequencies and the exact Benford probabilities for
the first digits as a basis to generate expected frequencies for the chi-square test statistic. The results of
the simulation (not tabulated) showed that the rejection rate was intolerably high .830.This result was
based on a Type I error rate of 0.05 , N  24,067 , and 25,000 independent chi-square sample statistics.
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The empirical rate of .830 is the proportion of rejections (i.e. p  0.05 ) associated with the 25,000 chisquare statistics. Thus, for large sample sizes, the chi-square goodness-of-fit test is not recommended.
The BREG procedure was also applied to another non-fraudulent data set (SPSS 2009)
consisting of N  5,990 credit card debt transactions and the Hill (1988) fabricated non-Benford-like
data with the same number of observations as the sample size of the Amount data ( N  24,067 ). The
results in Table 1 show that the leading first digit and second digit probabilities of the credit card debt
transactions follow Benford-like distributions because all bootstrap CIs contain Benford parameters or
overlap with exact CIs. In contrast, all bootstrap CIs associated with the fabricated non-Benford-like
data do not contain the Benford parameters or do not overlap with exact (or Benford) CIs. Thus, these
results are consistent with our prior knowledge on the nature of the data sets. In summary, the results in
Table 1 demonstrate that the BREG procedure ameliorates the excessive power problem in the context
of Benford’s Law.
In addition, the BREG procedure was applied to the Federal Election Commission (FEC) data
for the years 1994, 1996, and 2004.Inspection of Table 2 indicate that all four bootstrap CIs do not
contain Benford parameters or do not overlap with exact CIs for the 1994 and 2004 data. In terms of
the 1996 data, one of the four CIs   0  neither contains nor overlaps with exact CIs. As such, these
results provide evidence of addressing the Type II error problem because they corroborate with the
findings of Cho and Gaines (2007) who suggest that potential irregularities with the “soft” money
contributions exist in the 1994, 1996, and 2004 FEC data.
Finally, we examined the Mexican retail company’s daily transactions for each one of the
following accounts of Divisions 1, 2, and 3 from 2007 to 2009: (a) credit/cash sales, (b) cash
collection, (c) check/cash deposits, (d) inventory, and (e) purchase/purchase returns. The results
presented in Table 3 suggest that none of the accounts of Division 1 likely exhibits unusual patterns of
transactions except for the inventory account. Other accounts such as adjustments to inventory, sales
returns, and inventory write-offs were not examined due to an insufficient number of observations
(e.g., N  14 ).
Based on our findings, the retail company initiated further investigation and provided the
following commenti:
[The results of the study—diagnostic reports from Bootstrap regression analyses—for Division
1 coincide with unusual movements of inventory that we were able to detect based on further
audit testing. Currently, these transactions are under investigations].
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Table 4 and Table 5 present results associated with Division 2 and Division 3, respectively.
These results suggest presence of unusual transactions in cash sales and inventory accounts as three out
of the four bootstrap CIs associated with these accounts do not contain their respective Benford
parameter or do not overlap with their corresponding exact CI. It is likely that these unusual patterns
are connected to each other because the accounting information system of the Mexican retail company
is designed in such a manner where inventory records are linked to both cash/credit sales and
purchase/purchase return records. Another reason of our conjecture relates to a small number of
observations in purchase/purchase return accounts (e.g., N  9 ) for Division 2 and the results in Table
3 indicate that data anomalies with purchase/purchase return accounts likely do not exist in Division
3.Given our diagnostic reports, the retail company initiated further investigations in Division 2 and
Division 3 and provided us with the following feedbackii:
[The results of the study—diagnostic reports from Bootstrap regression analyses—related to
Division 2 match with unusual movements of cash sales, and inventory. However, additional
audit testing results indicate that unusual fluctuations in cash sales relate to promotion periods
and that the unusual fluctuations in both accounts are immaterial].
[The results of the study—diagnostic reports from Bootstrap regression analyses—
corresponding to Division 3 coincide with the reality. That is, we were able to determine the
existence of unusual transactions in inventory and cash sales. Additional investigations confirm
that these transactions were fraudulent. Currently, we are acting on this critical situation].
DICUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The overall results associated with the non-fraudulent, fabricated non-Benford-like, allegedly
fraudulent, and the Mexican retail company data sets demonstrate that the proposed BREG procedure
accurately assess for the presence of unusual fluctuations in financial data (i.e., data anomaly).The
BREG procedure, like other analytic techniques, does not identify the location of unusual patterns of
transactions, but indicates the presence of these problems i.e., errors or fraud. Other analytic
techniques such as ratio analyses compare the book value of a ratio in month t ( Rt ) to the expected
audited value of a ratio for month t ( Rˆt ) to assess significant deviations from the critical value (Kinney
1987, p. 64). The problem with this approach is the precision level of Rˆt that may be in error due to
undetected misstatements or fraud in prior audits.
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Similarly, trend analysis uses arbitrarily selected cut-off values (e.g., 5%, 10% or 15%) to
balance between Type I and Type II errors. Loebbecke and Steinbart(1987) indicate that this “cut-off
value” approach is “little better than biased coin flips” (p. 87).Alternative statistical analytic techniques
(Dzeng 1994, Kinney and Salamon 1982, Kinney 1979) such as regression analysis and the vector
autoregressive model(VAR) utilize past information of the account under audit and other explanatory
variable(s) whereas the univariate autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) and the random
walk model use only past data of the account under audit. Each one of these techniques may be
efficient and effective if past financial data are not contaminated with unusual fluctuations (Hitzig
2004).
In contrast, the effectiveness and efficiency of the BREG procedure is impervious to the quality
of past financial data. Based on the BREG procedure, we were able to detect the presence of
misstatements and/or fraud in inventory and cash sales accounts associated with the Mexican retail
company’s data across three divisions over a time period of 2007-2009.As opposed to the BREG
procedure, the results associated with a statistical analytic technique such as a standard regression
analysis2were inconsistent. For example, when cash sales were regressed on cost of goods sold, we
found no evidence of unusual fluctuations in Division 1, but confounding results in Division 2 and
Division 3. Specifically, given a 95% confidence level, the cash sales overstatement errors were not
material3 in year 2008, but material in year 2009 for Division 3 and vice versa for Division 2.These
results suggest that the use of the intercepts and slope coefficients corresponding to 2007 or 2007-2008
financial data was not effective to infer a possible anomaly in cash sales and, thus, conclude a need for
a further investigation (i.e., committed Type II errors). Furthermore, when inventory was regressed on
net purchases, the results provide evidence of unusual fluctuations in Division 2 and Division 3, but
inconsistent results for Division 1. That is, the inventory overstatement errors were not material in year
2008, but material in year 2009.
In addition to effectiveness, the BREG procedure efficiently examines, for example, daily or
monthly disaggregated financial data across different accounts or classes of transactions while
mitigating Type I error as the number of digits to examine increases or the excessive power problem as
the volume of transactions becomes large. Unlike other statistical analytic techniques, the BREG
2

We could not conduct a ratio analysis because the Mexican retail company is small and private and the industry benchmark
information available for the ratio analysis only pertains to big listed retail companies.
3
The overstatement accounting errors is considered material if the 1-  upper precision limit is less than a material amount.
See Kinney (1979) or Kinney and Salamon (1982) for more information.
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procedure allows an auditor to minimize the Type I error problem because (a) digit patterns are
examined on an overall basis rather than a digit-by-digit basis and (b) the diagnostics are insensitive to
large volumes of transactions unlike other inferential procedures e.g., the chi-square goodness of fit
test or the Nigrini (1996) Distortion Factor Index. This was demonstrated with the SPSS (2009) new
customer purchasing transactions ( N  24,067 ).
We believe that applications of the BREG procedure can be extended to a continuous auditing
system which allows auditors to examine the entire population rather than to just mere samples of
business transactions. Implementing the BREG procedure as part of continuous auditing system is
feasible because most of financial data are recorded electronically and the majority of these records are
not backed-up with paper documentation (Corbett et al. 2006) and because accessible statistical
software (e.g., TIBCO SpotfireS+ or SPSS[PASW] statistics with the bootstrap add-on package)
allows practitioners to conduct bootstrap regression analyses in a computationally efficient manner.
The advantage of applying the BREG procedure to the entire population data or part of a
continuous auditing system on a daily, weekly, or monthly basis is an opportunity for auditors (or
forensic accountants) to minimize the material cost of concluding absence of unusual fluctuations
when in fact these fluctuations exist—i.e., Type II error. Timely assessments of financial data propriety
per account or classes of transactions would indeed allow firms to make adequate corrections or take
appropriate actions and improve the quality of financial reporting (Kogan et al. 2010). Nevertheless,
we suggest that the BREG procedures be applied to different financial data sets and different
companies to test the robustness of the proposed procedure and incorporate this procedure as part of
the Computer Assisted Auditing Tools and Techniques (CAATTs) e.g., ACL (2006).
We would also note that certain conditions of financial data make applications of the BREG
procedure not recommendable. Examples of these conditions relate to (1) non-randomly generated data
(e.g., check numbers, zip codes or invoice numbers), (2) data with maximum or minimum thresholds,
(3) data with specific assigned amounts, or (4) non-existing records. For more information see Durtschi
et al. (2004, p. 24) and Rodriguez (2004). Thus, we recommend that readers of this study interpret our
results with care and auditors or forensic accountants apply the BREG procedure given a preliminary
understanding of the nature of financial data under audit or investigation.
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APPENDIX A
Table A.1. First digit probabilities.
First Digits  d1 
1
0.301
0.289
0.308
0.147

Exact Benford
Empirical Benford
Amount
Fabricated Data
Exact Benford =
Empirical Benford =
Amount =

Fabricated Data =

2
0.176
0.195
0.179
0.100

3
0.125
0.127
0.125
0.104

4
0.097
0.091
0.094
0.133

5
0.079
0.075
0.075
0.097

6
0.067
0.064
0.066
0.157

7
0.058
0.054
0.056
0.120

8
0.051
0.055
0.051
0.084

9
0.046
0.051
0.047
0.058

Theoretical probabilities and are computed using equation B.1 in Appendix B.
Empirical first digit probabilities estimated by Benford (1938) who used a sample of
20,229 observations.
Empirical first digit probabilities associated with dollar amount of purchases for each
individual targeted by a marketing campaign (SPSS 2009).Amount probabilities are
based on N=24,067.
First digits generated by MINITAB based on the first digit probability distribution
provided by Hill(1988).

Table A.2. Second digit probabilities.
Second Digits  d 2 
Exact Benford
Amount
Fabricated
Data

0
0.120
0.118
0.058

Exact Benford =
Amount =

Fabricated Data =

1
0.114
0.116
0.106

2
0.109
0.109
0.117

3
0.104
0.102
0.109

4
0.100
0.100
0.105

5
0.097
0.094
0.100

6
0.093
0.095
0.112

7
0.090
0.092
0.128

8
0.088
0.087
0.073

Theoretical probabilities and are computed using equation B.1 in Appendix B.
Empirical first digit probabilities associated with dollar amount of purchases for each
individual targeted by a marketing campaign (SPSS 2009).Amount probabilities are
based on N=24,067.
First digits generated by MINITAB based on the first digit probability distribution
provided by Hill(1988).

39

9
0.085
0.085
0.092

Journal of Forensic & Investigative Accounting
Vol. 3, Issue 3, 2011

APPENDIX B
The exact Benford probabilities ( P ) for the first digits d1 , second digits d 2 , and the first and second
digits d1d 2 are, respectively

Pd1  log10 1  1 d1  where d1  1,...,9

(B.1)

Pd2   d 1 log10 1  1 d1d 2  where d2  0,...,9

(B.2)

Pd1d2  log10 1  1 d1d2  where d1d2  10,...,99

(B.3)

9

1

The Benford parameters in (4) and (5) can be expressed as (e.g. Pedhazur, 1997; p. 102)

1  d d

1 2

d
 0.048018
d

(B.4)

1

2

0  d  1d  3.239170
1

(B.5)

2

1  d d

1 2

d
 0.065439
d

(B.6)

2

1

0  d  1d  3.962264
2

(B.7)

1

where  d1 d2 is the Pearson correlation,  d1 and d2 are means, and  d1 and  d2 are standard deviations
associated with the first digits ( d1 ) and second digits ( d 2 ).
The population means for the first digits and the second digits are d1   d 1 d1Pd1  3.44024
9

1

and d2   d
9

2 0

d2 Pd2  4.18739 . The population standard deviation for the first digits is based on

 d2  E d12   d2 where the expected value E d12    d 1 d12 Pd  17.89174 and thus  d  2.46100 .
9

1

1

1

1

1

Analogously, the population standard deviation for the second digits is  d2  2.87294 where the
expected value E d22    d
9

d d   E  d1d2   d d
1 2

1

E  d1d2    d 1  d
9

1

9

2 0

2

2 0

 

d 22 Pd2  25.78802 . The population correlation is based on

 d  . The expected value of the first two digits is

d1

2

 d1  d2   Pd d

1 2

  14.80195 .
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Start

Execute algorithms to generate Exact
Benford first digits and second digits
given the sample size (N) of the actual
data.

Select the first digits and
the second digits of the
Actual Data(e.g., cash
sale transactions).

Select and input the first digits (
(

V1) and the second digits

V2)of the actual data (e.g., cash sale transactions) into
the TIBCO Spotfire S+ (Version 8.1, 2008)spreadsheet.

1.

Under the command resample using 25,000resamples, compute the estimates
the regression model

for

and their bootstrap CIs using the following

notations: Model → Expression [coef(lm(V1~V2))] based on the Bias-corrected (BCa) CI
default option and 97.5% confidence level.
2.

Under the command resample using 25,000resamples, compute the estimates
regression model

for the

and their bootstrap CIs using the following

notations: Model → Expression [coef(lm(V2~V1))] based on the Bias-corrected (BCa) CI
default option and 97.5% confidence level.

Decision Criteria:
Do all four bootstrap CIs contain Benford’s
parameters
or overlap with exact (or Benford)
CIs?

No

Infer that the financial data are
suspicious and initiate further
detailed test of transaction or
investigations.

Yes

Stop and
conclude that no
data anomalies
exist.

Figure 1. The bootstrap regression (BREG) procedure and the decision criteria.
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Figure 2.First digits exact (Benford) probabilities versus first digits empirical probabilities
associated with the Amount data (SPSS, 2008, File: customer_new.sav)
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Figure 3.Second digits exact (Benford) probabilities versus second digits empirical probabilities
associated with the Amount data (SPSS, 2008, File: customer_new.sav)
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Table 1. The 97.5% Bootstrap Confidence Intervals (CIs) for the Benford parameters of Purchasing and
Credit Debt Transactions (a) and Fabricated (Non-Benford) Financial Data. (b)Bold type indicates that all four
null hypotheses are rejected for the Fabricated Data.
Type of Data
N
0  3.23917
1  0.04802
0  3.96226
1  0.06544
Amount
Credit Card
Debt
Transactions
Fabricated
Data
**
(a)
(b)

24,067
5,990

(3.144, 3.269)**
(3.108, 3.355)**

(0.034, 0.059)**
(0.021, 0.070)**

(3.901, 4.042)**
(3.787, 4.068)**

(0.049, 0.083)**
(0.029, 0.095)**

24,067

(4.551, 4.690)

(-0.006, 0.020)

(4.451, 4.621)

(-0.008, 0.025)

Indicates the CI contains the Benford parameter.
Purchasing and credit debt transactions are obtained from SPSS(2008).
First digits and second digits are generated in MINITAB based on the probability distribution provided by Hill (1988).

Table 2. The 97.5% Bootstrap Confidence Intervals (CIs) for the Benford parameters of the Federal Election
Commission In-Kind Contributions.(c) Bold type indicates the null hypotheses are rejected for 1994, 1996, and
2004 data and that all three data sets would require further investigation.
Type of
N
0  3.23917
1  0.04802
0  3.96226
1  0.06544
Data
9,290
1994
(2.955, 3.107)
(-0.021, 0.015)
(3.402, 3.618)
(-0.036, 0.023)
11,513
(3.206, 3.336)**
(0.003, 0.034)*
(0.007, 0.067)**
1996
(3.005, 3.240)
8,861
2004
(3.364, 3.585)
(0.081, 0.129)
(3.432, 3.669)
(0.099, 0.156)
*
**
(c)

Indicates the CI overlaps with the Benford CI but does not contain the parameter.
Indicates the CI contains the Benford parameter.
Data are accessed at the Federal Election Commission (FEC) website http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/ftpdet.shtml.

Table 3. The 97.5% Bootstrap Confidence Intervals (CIs) for the Benford parameters of Credit/Cash Sales,
Cash Collection, Check/Cash Deposits, Inventory, Purchases and Purchase Returns associated with Division
1 (2007-2009).(d)Bold type indicates that all four null hypotheses are rejected for the Inventory account and
this data set would require further investigation.
Type of Data

N

0  3.23917

1  0.04802

0  3.96226

1  0.06544

Credit Sales
Cash Sales
Cash
Collection
Check
Deposits
Cash Deposits
Inventory
Purchases
Purchase
Returns

538
925
455

(2.711, 3.555)**
(3.393, 4.015)*
(2.526, 3.418)**

(-0.037, 0.136)**
(-0.004, 0.115)**
(-0.021, 0.165)**

(3.225, 4.168)**
(3.590, 4.440)**
(3.047, 4.046)**

(-0.047, 0.193)**
(-0.008, 0.182)**
(-0.021, 0.245)**

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

925
1,095
107
109

(2.961, 3.650)**
(4.444, 4.768)
(2.102, 3.951)**
(2.377, 4.111)**

(0.031, 0.161)**
(-0.145, -0.086)
(-0.052, 0.333)**
(-0.242, 0.068)**

(3.519, 4.290)**
(6.306, 7.519)
(2.304, 4.242)**
(3.180, 5.046)**

(0.046, 0.222)**
(-0.739, -0.448)
(-0.064, 0.378)**
(-0.329, 0.154)**

*
**
(d)
NA

Indicates the CI overlaps with the Benford CI but does not contain the parameter.
Indicates the CI contains the Benford parameter.
Data obtained from a retail Mexican company located in Mexico City.
Small sample size (i.e., N=14 or 59) or non-existent observations.
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Table 4. The 97.5% Bootstrap Confidence Intervals (CIs) for the Benford parameters of Credit/Cash Sales,
Cash Collection, Check/Cash Deposits, Inventory, Purchases and Purchase Returns associated with Division
2 (2007-2009).(d) Bold type indicates that three of the four null hypotheses are rejected for both the Cash
Sales and Inventory Accounts and that these two data sets would require further investigation.
Types of Data

N

0  3.23917

1  0.04802

0  3.96226

1  0.06544

Credit Sales
Cash Sales
Cash
Collection
Check
Deposits
Cash Deposits
Inventory
Purchases
Purchase
Returns

483
907
299

(2.723, 3.645)**
(2.018, 2.747)
(2.429, 3.527)**

(0.005, 0.191)**
(0.178, 0.349)
(-0.009, 0.224)**

(3.204, 4.180)**
(2.804, 3.381)
(2.905, 4.088)**

(0.013, 0.246)**
(0.135, 0.266)*
(-0.011, 0.281)**

837

(2.850, 3.479)**

(-0.069, 0.052)**

(4.090, 4.890)*

(-0.116, 0.094)**

907
1,095
NA
NA

(2.627, 3.389)**
(2.445, 3.042)*
NA
NA

(0.105, 0.260)*
(0.659, 0.754)
NA
NA

(3.070, 3.720)*
(0.353, 0.675)
NA
NA

(0.095, 0.235)*
(0.527, 0.610)
NA
NA

*
**
(d)
NA

Indicates the CI overlaps with the Benford CI but does not contain the parameter.
Indicates the CI contains the Benford parameter.
Data obtained from a retail Mexican company located in Mexico City.
Small sample size (i.e., N=14 or 59) or non-existent observations.

Table 5. The 97.5% Bootstrap Confidence Intervals (CIs) for the Benford parameters of Credit/Cash Sales,
Cash Collection, Check/Cash Deposits, Inventory, Purchases and Purchase Returns associated with Division
3 (2007-2009).(d) Bold type indicates that one null hypothesis is rejected for both the Cash Sales and
Inventory Accounts and that these two data sets would require further investigation.
Types of Data

N

0  3.23917

1  0.04802

0  3.96226

1  0.06544

Credit Sales
Cash Sales
Cash
Collection
Check
Deposits
Cash Deposits
Inventory
Purchases
Purchase
Returns

184
909
331

(2.005, 3.802)**
(3.236, 3.714)**
(2.547, 3.621)**

(-0.034, 0.248)**
(-0.092, 0.001)*
(-0.116, 0.106)**

(2.887, 4.513)**
(4.458, 5.429)
(3.434, 4.572)**

(-0.033, 0.375)**
(-0.272, -0.007)*
(-0.141, 0.148)**

361

(2.555, 3.629)**

(-0.091, 0.116)**

(3.547, 4.686)**

(-0.118, 0.169)**

909
1,095
201
82

(2.730, 3.202)*
(5.642, 6.128)
(2.734, 3.907)**
(1.791, 3.615)**

(-0.054, 0.040)*
(-0.069, 0.015)*
(-0.081, 0.134)**
(-0.037, 0.411)**

(4.055, 4.875)*
(4.137, 5.909)*
(3.472, 4.880)**
(1.509, 3.534)*

(-0.129, 0.103)**
(-0.254, 0.034)*
(-0.135, 0.209)**
(-0.045, 0.505)**

*
**
(d)
NA

Indicates the CI overlaps with the Benford CI but does not contain the parameter.
Indicates the CI contains the Benford parameter.
Data obtained from a retail Mexican company located in Mexico City.
Small sample size (i.e., N=14 or 59) or non-existent observations.
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We translated the Mexican retail company’s comments from Spanish to English. The following statement is the original
comments in Spanish for Division 1: “Los resultados que arroja el estudio con relación a la División 1, si coinciden con los
movimientos anormales detectados en los inventarios con base en nuestra auditoria. Actualmente, estos movimientos son
investigados para descartar posibles fraudes en el inventario.”
i

We translated the Mexican retail company’s comments from Spanish to English. The following statements are the original
comments in Spanish for Division 2 and Division 3: “Los resultados que arroja el estudio con relación a la División 2,
también coinciden con los movimientos anormales en las ventas al contado y en el inventario. Sin embargo, nuestras
investigaciones indican que las fluctuaciones en las ventas al contado tienen que ver con los periodos de promoción y que
no existe alguna posibilidad de error material en ambas cuentas.”
ii

“Los resultados que arroja el estudio con relación a la División 3 si coinciden con la realidad. Efectivamente, hemos
detectado la existencia de transacciones anormales en las cuentas de inventario y ventas al contado. Nuestras
investigaciones confirman que estas transacciones son fraudulentas. Actualmente, estamos tomando medidas con respecto a
esta situación crítica”
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